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Abstract
The paper studies the determinants of income distribution and
growth in an overlapping generations economy with heterogenous house-
holds. Our framework has the following main features: (1) heterogene-
ity of consumers with respect to wealth and parental human capital;
(2) intergenerational transfers, accomplished via investment in the
education of the younger generation. Heterogeneity in income results
from the distribution of human capital across individuals in a non-
degenerate way. The human capital production is a¤ected by ’home-
education’ , provided by the parents, as well as ’public-education’
which is provided equally to all young individuals of the same gener-
ation. Due to investments in human capital our economy exhibits en-
dogenous growth. First, we explore the e¤ects of technological change
in human capital formation, upon the distribution of income at each
date along the equilibrium path. Second, we study the impact of
such technogical progress on growth and relate these results to the in-
come distribution inequality. Third,we provide numerical simulations
to quantify the e¤ect of changes in the parameters of the model. Sim-
ulation results include exact Gini coe¢cients and tax rate on labor
determined endogenously through majority voting.
JEL classi…cation: D9; E2; F2; J2
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1 Introduction
It is well established in many studies by economists (and sociologists) that
education plays a signi…cant role in shaping the income distribution and the
growth process. We observe in recent decades increasing awareness of gov-
ernments in the education process and, consequently, in enhancing invest-
ments to promote human capital skills. In recent years, as the information
technology advances and computors are being integrated into the learning
technology, we are witnessing some important technological progress in the
process of human capital formation. In this paper we shall investigate the
e¤ects of various kinds of technological improvements on growth and the
intragenerational distribution of income.
Education/training lies in the heart of our model and it is composed of
two parts: The parental role which takes place at ’home’, mainly during
the period of ’youth’, and the ’out of home’ schooling, or the ’public part’
which, in most cases, is provided by the government and in‡uenced by the
’environment’. Home education is provided by the close family and it is
carried out through parental tutoring, social interaction, learning devices
available at home (such as computors), etc. In this case the human capital of
parents and the time they dedicate to teaching/ tutoring play an important
role. The government in our education process has two main tasks: First,
in organizing the public provision of education and determining the ’level’ of
public schooling and, second, in …nancing the public provision of education
via taxes on wage income. We shall not attempt in this paper, except in our
numerical simulations, to study the process which determines the ’level of
public schooling’, but rather take it as given in each period. Clearly, given
the initial distribution of human capital (and of income) some democratic
process will lead to certain decisions, based on the principle that education
is provided equally to the younger generation, while the taxes paid by each
individual to …nance public education depend on his level of income.
We consider an overlapping generations economy which produces a single
good using two types of production factors: physical capital and human
capital. It starts at date 0 with some given initial distribution of human
capital and physical capital stock. Due to investments in human capital
of the younger generation, the economy exhibits endogenous growth. Each
individual lives for three periods: the ’youth’ period in which no economic
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decisions are made but education is acquired, the ’working period’ where
this individual earns wage income, and the ’retirement period’ in which only
consumption takes place. Intergenerational transfers in our economy take
place only in the form of investment, made by parents, in educating their
o¤spring and in the provision of public education.
When looking at the e¤ects of technological changes in human capital
formation we …nd that in some cases a more equal intragenerational income
distribution coincides with higher output, while in other cases certain tech-
nological improvements enhance growth but make income distribution less
equal. Basically, an important result of this work is to point out that the
way in which technological progress a¤ects the process of human capital
accumulation matters. If improvements occur mainly in ’home-education’
we …nd that growth increases while inequality in income distributions in-
creases. On the other hand, when the technological improvement a¤ects
mostly ’public-education’ then we witness higher growth but less inequality
in income distribution.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
reviews some related literature. Section 3 presents a process of human cap-
ital formation which is part of an OLG model with altruistic heterogenous
agents and characterizes the equilibrium of a closed economy. Numerical
simulations illustrate the properties of the model. Section 4 studies and
simulates the e¤ects of changes in educational technology and externalities
on growth and intragenerational income distributions. Section 5 presents
numerical simulations of our dynamic general equilibrium model when ma-
jority voting determines the level of public schooling. Section 6 discusses the
main results of the paper and the Appendix contains proofs to facilitate the
reading.
2 Related Literature
Endogenous growth models have attracted tremendous attention in eco-
nomics in the last two decades. As was demonstrated in various ways in the
literature they provide an extremely e¢cient analytical tool in studying is-
sues related to growth, convergence and distribution of income in equilibrium
[see, e.g., Loury (1981), Becker and Tomes (1986), Lucas (1988), Azariadis
and Drazen (1990), Tamura (1991), Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Eckstein
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and Zilcha (1994), Fischer and Serra (1996), Eicher (1996), Fernandez and
Rogerson (1998), van Marrewijk (1999), Galor and Moav (2000), Viaene and
Zilcha (2001)]. A central feature in all these studies is the way in which the
evolution process of human capital is modelled. This process is complex since
the accumulation of human capital or skills depends not only on parents, the
’environment’, teachers, schools and investment in education, but also on
technology and culture. However, the production function for human capital
used in economic models concentrate, for tractability reasons, on very few
parameters [see, e.g., Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995)]. Like that part of the lit-
erature, production in our framework is constrained by education and work
experience. Our model in the stationary state is an AK-type endogenous
growth model where all variables grow at the same rate as e¤ective labor.
The advantage of our OLG framework is that, in contrast to the existing
literature, it allows for a comparison, period by period, of non-stationary
competitive equilibria.
Statistical o¢ces of international organizations compile extensive lists of
indicators that describe and compare educational achievements across coun-
tries [see, e.g., OECD (1997)]. While these features vary from country to
country and thus there may not be a single theory that characterizes all the
observed developments, two main common elements have inspired our frame-
work of analysis. First, the production function for human capital exhibits
the property that individuals from a below-average families have a greater
return to human capital investment derived from public schooling than those
from above-average human capital families. Also, the e¤ort, and therefore
cost, of acquiring human capital for the younger generation is smaller for
societies endowed with relatively higher levels of human capital [see, e.g.,
Tamura (1991), Fischer and Serra (1996)]. Second, parental tutoring plays
an important role. For example, Glaeser (1994) divides the education’s pos-
itive e¤ects on economic growth into parts, and concludes that children in
families with educated parents seem to obtain a better education than do
those children without that supportive context. Also, Burnhill et al. (1990)
…nd that parental education in‡uences entry to higher education in Scot-
land over and above the in‡uence of parental social class. A reason which is
put forward is that parental education elicits more parental involvement at
home. An important di¤erence between our process of human capital accu-
mulation and most cases discussed in the literature is the representation of
private and public inputs via time in the production of human capital. Our
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approach suggests that the time spent learning , coupled with the human
capital of the instructors, and not the expenditures on education should be
the relevant variables in this process. This distinction is important since in a
dynamic framework the cost of …nancing a particular level of human capital
‡uctuates with relative factor rewards.
There is some analogy between the objectives of our paper and those
analyzed in Eicher (1996). The latter looks at the endogenous absorption
of new technologies into production on endogenous growth and the wage of
skilled relative to non-skilled labor. While technological change is exogenous
in our model, we have a continuum of skills which provides insights into how
technological change in‡uences the equilibrium income distribution, partly
through incentives to acquire human capital. Unlike Eicher (1996), individ-
uals do not invest in their own human capital. With compulsory schooling
in mind, it seems that the acts of training are not fully decided by the young
generations.
Income distribution is another key economic issue and its importance is
forcing economists and policymakers to improve their understanding of its
underlying determinants. Evidence of a rise in income inequality has been
observed in a large number of OECD countries. Some believe that social
norms are crucial determinants of earnings inequality [e.g., Atkinson (1999),
Corneo and Jeanne (2001)]. In contrast, there is a widely held belief that this
rise is driven by events like progress in information technology, integration
of world trade and …nancial markets. The role of human capital accumu-
lation on income distribution was thoroughly studied by many researchers
in various contexts [see, e.g., Loury (1981), Becker and Tomes (1986), Ga-
lor and Zeira (1993), Fernandez and Rogerson (1998), Viaene and Zilcha
(2001)]. Others have shown great interest in the impact of income inequality
on economic systems. For example, it was shown by Glomm and Ravikumar
(1992) that majority voting results in a public educational system as long as
the income distribution is negatively skewed. Cardak (1999) strenghens this
result by considering a voting mechanism where the median preference for
education expenditure, rather than median income household, is the decisive
voter. There is also the popular claim that income inequality is harmful to
economic growth. Some empirical …ndings indicate indeed that the conjec-
ture of a negative e¤ect holds [see, e.g. Persson and Tabellini (1994)]. More
recent evidence di¤ers, however, depending on the sample period, on the
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sample of countries and on whether time-series or cross-section estimation
techniques are used [see, e.g., Forbes (2000)], a fact which is also obtained in
our theoretical work.
3 The Model
3.1 Human Capital Formation
Consider an overlapping generations economy with a continuum of consumers
in each generation, each living for three periods. During the …rst period
each child gets education, but takes no economic decision. Individuals are
economically active during a single working period which is followed by the
retirement period. At the beginning of the ’working period’, each parent
gives birth to one o¤spring. An agent is characterized by his/her family
name ! 2 [0; 1], population is normalized to unity. Denote by - the set
of families in each generation: - is time independent since we assume no
population growth. Denote by ¹ the Lebesgue measure on -:
Agents are endowed with two units of time in their second period: one
is inelastically supplied to the labor market while the other is allocated be-
tween leisure and time invested in generating human capital of the o¤spring.
The motivation for parental tutoring is the utility parents derive from the
future lifetime income of their child. Besides self-educating their own child,
parents also pay (by taxes) for formal education, to enhance the human cap-
ital of their child. Consider generation t, i.e., all individuals ! born at the
outset of date t, denoted Gt , and denote by ht+1(!) the level of human
capital of family !’s child: We assume that the production function for hu-
man capital is composed of two components: informal education provided by
the parents and public education provided by ’teachers’ and the social envi-
ronment. Informal education depends on the time allocated by the parents
to this purpose, denoted by et(!), and the ’quality of tutoring’ represented
by the parent’s human capital level ht(!). The time allocated to schooling
by the public education system is denoted by egt, and we assume that the
human capital of the teachers determine the ’quality’ of this contribution to
the formation of human capital. We assume that, for some constants ¯1 > 1;
¯2 > 1; À > 0 and ´ > 0; a family’s human capital evolves as follows:
ht+1(!) = ¯1et(!)h
À
t (!) + ¯2egth
´
t (1)
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where the average human capital of ’teachers’ is the average human cap-
ital of generation t, denoted ht. This can be justi…ed if we assume that
the individuals engaged in education in each generation, called ’teachers’,
are chosen randomly from the population of that generation. The parame-
ters À and ´ measure the intensity of the externalities derived from parents’
and society’s human capital respectively. The constants ¯1 and ¯2 repre-
sent the e¢ciency of informal and formal education: ¯1 is a¤ected by the
home environment while ¯2 is a¤ected by facilities, the schooling system, the
neighborhood, social interactions, organization, etc. A similar human capital
formation process to this one has been used in Eckstein and Zilcha (1994).
The assumption that teachers have the average level of human capital
has a number of implications for our analysis. On the one hand, it allows
a feedback to occur between the rest of the model and teacher quality, an
element of complication. On the other hand, it leads to a simpli…cation in
that the tax rate on labor is equal to time allocated to schooling by the public
education. To see that, consider the lifetime income of individual !, denoted
by yt(!). Since the human capital of a worker is observable and constitutes
the only source of income, it depends on the e¤ective labor supply:
yt(!) = wt(1 ¡ ¿ t)ht(!) (2)
where wt is the wage rate in period t and ¿ t is the tax rate on labor
income.1 Under the public education regime taxes on incomes …nance the
costs of educating the young generation. Making use of (1) and (2), balanced
government budget means:Z
-
wtegthtd¹(!) =
Z
-
¿ twtht(!)d¹(!)
or equivalently,
egt = ¿ t (3)
that is, the tax rate on labor is equal to the proportion of the economy’s
e¤ective labor used for public education.2
1The heterogeneity of consumers stems from the heterogeneity of income. As wt and
¿ t are common to all agents, (2) clearly indicates that heterogeneity of incomes derives
from the distribution of human capital across individuals.
2In contrast, under a decentralized system, both ¿ t(!) and egt(!) are decision variables
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3.2 Equilibrium
Production in this economy is carried out by competitive …rms that produce a
single commodity, using e¤ective labor and physical capital. This commodity
serves for consumption and also as an input in production. There is a full
depreciation of the physical capital. The per-capita human capital in date t,
ht, (not including the human capital devoted to formal education) is an input
in the production process. In particular we take the aggregate production
function to be:
qt = F (kt; (1 ¡ egt)ht) (4)
where kt is the capital stock and (1 ¡ egt)ht = (1 ¡ ¿ t)ht is the e¤ec-
tive human capital used in the production process. F(¢,¢) is assumed to
exhibit constant returns to scale, it is strictly increasing, concave, contin-
uously di¤erentiable and satis…es Fk(0; (1 ¡ ¿ t)ht) = 1; Fh(kt; 0) = 1;
F (0; (1 ¡ ¿ t)ht) = F (kt; 0) = 0: Given this, agent ! at time t maximizes the
following lifetime utility:
max
et;st
ut(!) = c1t(!)®1c2t(!)®2yt+1(!)a3 [1 ¡ et(!)]®4 (5)
subject to
c1t(!) = yt(!) ¡ st(!) ¸ 0 (6)
c2t(!) = (1 + rt+1)st(!) (7)
wt = Fh(kt; (1 ¡ egt)ht) (8)
of agents and the individual’s budget constraint on private education is:
¿ t(!)wtht(!) = wtegt(!)ht
where the level of teachers’ instruction is chosen freely from the market but their average
human capital is the same as the economy’s. Aggregate resources invested in education
then become: Z
-
egt(!)d¹(!) =
1
ht
Z
-
¿ t(!)ht(!)d¹(!);
which depend upon the distribution of human capital in each date. This is not the case
under public education.
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(1 + rt) = Fk(kt; (1 ¡ egt)ht) (9)
kt+1 =
Z
-
st(!)d¹(!) (10)
where income yt(!) is de…ned by (2) and human capital ht+1(!) is given
by (1). The ®0is are known parameters and ®i > 0 for i = 1; 2; 3; 4; c1t(!)
and c2t(!) denote, respectively, consumption in …rst and second period of
the individual’s life; st(!) represents savings; leisure is given by (1 ¡ et(!));
(1 + rt) is the interest factor at date t. The o¤spring’s income, given by
yt+1(!); enters parents’ preferences directly and represents the motivation
for parents’ tutoring and formal education expenditure. Eq. (6) is individual
!’s budget constraint. Eqs. (8) and (9) are the clearing conditions on factor
markets. Condition (10) is a market clearing condition for physical capital,
equating the aggregate capital stock at date t + 1 to the aggregate savings
at date t:
After substituting the constraints, the …rst-order conditions that lead to
the necessary and su¢cient conditions for optimum are:
c1t
c2t
=
®1
®2(1 + rt+1)
(11)
®4
(1 ¡ et(!)) =
¯1®3(1 ¡ ¿ t+1)wt+1hÀt (!)
yt+1(!)
; if et(!) > 0
(12)
¸ if et(!) = 0: (13)
The last equation allocates the unit of non-working time between leisure
and the time spent on education by the parents. The latter, et(!); increases
with the parents’ human capital hÀt and the wage, net of taxes, at the future
date. Eq. (12) establishes a negative relationship between types of education,
that is, public education substitutes for parental tutoring as ¿ t+1 increases.
Hence, for each individual there exists a particular value of the tax rate such
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that et(!) = 0. This is obtained when the marginal utility of leisure is larger
than the net future wage received from a marginal increase in the human
capital of the younger generation as a result of parental tutoring. From (6),
(7) and (11) we also obtain:
c1t(!) =
µ
®1
®1 + ®2
¶
yt(!) (14)
st(!) =
µ
®2
®1 + ®2
¶
yt(!) (15)
It is useful to derive the evolution of human capital from the …rst order
conditions. Making use of (12), the human capital of a dynasty given by (1)
can be rewritten as follows:
ht+1(!) =
µ
®3
®3 + ®4
¶h
¯1h
À
t (!) + ¯2¿ th
´
t
i
(16)
De…ne the growth factor of aggregate labor as:
°t ´ ht+1ht ´
s- ht+1(!)d¹(!)
s- ht(!)d¹(!) (17)
Substitution of (16) in (17) gives us an alternative expression for °t :
°t =
µ
®3
®3 + ®4
¶·
¯1
s- hÀt (!)d¹(!)
s- ht(!)d¹(!) + ¯2¿ th
´¡1
t
¸
(18)
It is clear from (18) that the growth factor of e¤ective labor is the sum of
two terms, one representing the contribution of parental tutoring, the other
the contribution of public education. While the latter is in‡uenced by the
tax rate the former depends upon the distribution of human capital at each
date.
3.3 Numerical Simulations
The aim of this section is to introduce a dynamic computable general equi-
librium model with heterogenous agents and to characterize the properties of
the equilibria of the model discussed so far. In particular, we are interested
11
in establishing the relationship between changes in some parameters, and the
growth and distribution of income that can be sustained in equilibrium. To
facilitate the interpretation of our theoretical results the …rst set of numerical
simulations assume that the sequence of ¿ t is exogenously given. Later in
Section 5, we allow for the tax rate to be endogenously determined through
majority voting.
In our numerical examples we replace (4) by the Cobb-Douglas production
function qt = Akµt (1 ¡ ¿ t)1¡µh1¡µt ; that is wt = A(1 ¡ µ) (kt=(1 ¡ ¿ t)ht)µ and
(1 + rt) = Aµ ((1 ¡ ¿ t)ht=kt)1¡µ : In the baseline case, we assume that the
economy is in a steady-state. To characterize the latter, consider Eqs. (2);
(10), (15) and the Cobb-Douglas production function to obtain:
kt+1
kt
=
(1 ¡ µ)®2
µ(®1 + ®2)
(1 + rt) (19)
Making use of (17) and of the expression for the rental rate:
kt+1
ht+1
=
A®2(1 ¡ µ)
(®1 + ®2)
(1 ¡ ¿ t)1¡µ(°t)¡1
µ
kt
ht
¶µ
(20)
which describes the dynamic path of the capital-labor ratio of the econ-
omy. In the long-run kt+1=ht+1 = kt=ht is a constant k=h if ¿ t = ¿ and °t = °:
The time-independence of ° can be obtained by incorporating externalities
that yield constant returns to scale to parents’ and society’s human capital
in (1), namely assuming À = ´ = 1: In that case we obtain the long-run
capital-labor ratio from (20):
k
h
= (1 ¡ ¿ )
·
®2(1 ¡ µ)A
°(®1 + ®2)
¸ 1
(1¡µ)
(21)
From the above equations, we obtain the expression for long-run output
and income growth:
qt+1
qt
=
R
- yt+1(!)d¹(!)R
- yt(!)d¹(!)
=
®2(1 ¡ µ)A
(®1 + ®2)
µ
h(1 ¡ ¿ )
k
¶1¡µ
Substituting (21) in this last expression gives:
qt+1
qt
= °
12
Long-run economic growth coincides with the growth factor of e¤ective
labor (°); regardless of initial conditions. Our model in the stationary state
is therefore an AK-type endogenous growth model where all variables grow
at the rate (° ¡ 1):
Besides À = ´ = 1; we assume that the other baseline parameters are
k¡1 = 70:019; ¿ = 0:2; ®1 = ®2 = ®4 = 1; ®3 = 2; A = 4; µ = :3 and ¯1 =
¯2 = 1:6: We consider a discrete number of heterogenous families, namely
11, with a human capital at t = ¡1 taking the values 1; 2; :::8; 11; 14; 16: The
initial endowments in physical and human capital were chosen with three
criteria in mind. First, the values of the endogenous variables that follow
from these initial conditions and parameter values are long-run values at all
dates. Second, the initial heterogeneity in human capital calibrates an exact
Gini coe¢cient close to the European average, namely 0.309 in period 0.
Third, the distribution of human capital is negatively skewed, a fact which
is observed in many countries. The median lies therefore to the left of the
mean. The following formula for the Gini coe¢cient is used:
gt =
1
2n2yt
nX
i=1
nX
j=1
jyi ¡ yjj (22)
where n represents the number of families, yt is average income, yi and
yj are individual incomes.
Given the set of baseline parameters of the model, the equilibrium path of
all variables belonging to a particular family is obtained in two steps. First,
the human capital of any individual at date t is given by (16). Aggregating
the levels of human capital across individuals and equating the aggregate
capital stock at date t to the aggregate savings at date t ¡ 1 (see (10)),
we obtain aggregate production qt; the equilibrium wt and (1 + rt): Upon
this information, each individual derives his/her income yt(!) from (2) and
summary statistics like the Gini coe¢cient can be computed. Second, given
the time path of wages, marginal returns to physical capital and income of
each dynasty, each individual can compute et(!); c1t(!); c2t(!); and ut(!):
[Insert Table 1]
Table 1 presents the solution for our baseline case and the equilibrium
corresponding to a 10% increase in each parameter of the utility function.
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Changes in other parameters are emphasized in the next section. In the
numerical simulations, given the chosen parameters we solve the model for
200 periods. As patterns emerge within 20 periods we discard the last 180
periods and compute the relevant statistics averaging over the …rst 10 periods
and over the second 10 periods.
A feature of the baseline is the decreasing inequality among dynasties.
Though families start in period 0 with very di¤erent endowments, they tend
to be similar after 20 periods. This shows the strength of public education
relative to parental tutoring in the accumulation of human capital. This
result is obtained even though families have di¤erent degrees of parental
tutoring as indicated by the last two rows. Changes in the parameters of the
utility function do not a¤ect the income distribution results. Though they
modify individual incomes, the latter are modi…ed altogether in the same
proportion as they all share the same utility function. Results in columns (2)
and (3) can be best explained by referring to (14) and (15). While an increase
in ®1 is conducive to less savings and more current consumption, an increase
in ®2 leads to the reverse. While an increase in ®1 leads to somewhat lesser
growth in the short-run and higher rental rates when compared to baseline,
the opposite occurs in column (3). Columns (4) and (5) contrast stronger
altruistic preferences with stronger preferences for leisure respectively. It
is important to note the marked di¤erences in growth rates and parental
education. More altruism leads to higher levels of human capital via more
parental e¤orts in education and ultimately to higher long-run growth rates.
The opposite occurs with a higher ®4:
4 Income Distribution and Growth
The focus of this section is to consider the inequality in the intragenerational
income distribution, in equilibrium, and relate it to the various parameters
of our dynamic model. At the same time, we wish to explore the relationship
between inequality and growth. Our explanation will be based on the extent
of e¢ciencies and externalities in the process of human capital accumulation.
We shall use the relations that we derived in the previous section to obtain
an expression for income at date t + 1, yt+1(!): To that end isolate yt+1(!)
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in (13) and make use of (1), (2) and (3) to obtain:
yt+1(!) =
µ
®3
®3 + ®4
¶
(1 ¡ ¿ t+1)wt+1
h
¯1h
À
t (!) + ¯2egth
´
t
i
(23)
Eq. (23) determines income at the future date in terms of the net wage
at date t + 1; the parents’ and society’s level of human capital at date t;
the current education input (¿ t = egt) and the externalities in education.
Note that in this framework there is no direct dependence of incomes across
generations.
We shall use a de…nition to compare distribution functions. Let X and
W be two random variables with values in a bounded interval in (¡1;1)
and let mx and mw denote their respective means. De…ne bX = X=mx andcW = W=mw: Denote by Fx and Fw the cumulative distribution functions
of bX and cW; respectively. Let [a; b] be the smallest interval containing the
supports of bX and cW:
De…nition: Fx is more equal than Fw if, for all t 2 [a; b]; R ta [Fx(s) ¡
Fw(s)]ds · 0:
Thus, Fx is more equal than Fw if Fx dominates in the second-degree
stochastic dominance Fw:This de…nition, due to Atkinson (1970), is equiva-
lent to the requirement that the Lorenz curve corresponding to X is every-
where above that of W: We say that X is more equal than W if the c.d.f. ofbX and cW satisfy: Fx is more equal than Fw. Henceforth the relation X is
more equal than W is denoted X À W: We say that X is equivalent to W;
and denote this relation by X ¼ W , if X ÀW and W À X:
4.1 Initial Conditions
Consider two similar economies which di¤er only in the initial distributions of
human capital: one economy has higher levels of human capital but the same
inequality of human capital distribution. Can we compare the equilibrium
intragenerational income distributions of these two economies over time? The
next proposition provides an answer.
Proposition 1 Consider two economies which di¤er only in their initial
human capital distributions, h0(!) and h¤0(!). Assume that h¤0(!) > h0(!)
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for all ! , but h¤0(!) ¼ h0(!), namely, these two distributions have the same
level of inequality. Then, the equilibrium from h¤0(!) will have less unequal
intragenerational income distributions at all dates t; t = 1; 2; 3; :::::
Proof. See the Appendix.
This result indicates that a country that starts with higher levels of human
capital, not necessarily more equal, has a better chance to maintain more
equality in its future income distributions.
4.2 Public Education
Throughout this section we shall assume that public provision of education
is determined by the government, say by elections or other social decision
mechanism, and it is equal to egt in date t and …nanced by taxing labor
income at a …xed rate ¿ t > 0. In the sequel we shall assume that v · 1 and
that ´ · 1. Let us consider the variation over time of the inequality in the
distribution of income.
Proposition 2 If the same tax rate applies to all levels of income, along
the equilibrium path the inequality in intragenerational income distribution
at date t + 1 is smaller than the inequality in the distribution of income at
date t.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Column (1) of Table 1 indicated already that under the assumption that
the tax rate is the same for all levels of income, inequality declines over time.
The inequality in income distribution at date t+1 is indeed smaller than the
inequality in income distribution at date t and in the limit families tend to
the same level of human capital and income. Let us show now that a higher
provision of public education reduces inequality in the distribution of income
in each generation.
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Proposition 3 In the above economy let h0(!) be the initial human cap-
ital distribution. Increasing the public provision of education results in less
inequality in the intragenerational income distribution in each date.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This result may not be surprising since public education is provided
equally to all young individuals (of the same generation), while it is …nanced
by a ‡at tax rate on wage income. However, its importance lies in the fact
that it is proved in equilibrium and that it holds in all future periods. It is
also clear from (18) that, when À = ´ = 1; more public education contributes
to a higher long-run growth rate of e¤ective labor.
[Insert Table 2]
These results are quanti…ed in the two columns of Table 2 where ¿ t takes
two values, 0.20 and 0.22 respectively. Besides increasing the long-run growth
rate of output and decreasing the inequality in the income distribution, Table
2 con…rms the substitution among education types. Public education crowds
out parental tutoring though the elasticity computed at steady state values
is about -.1 and thus quite small.
4.3 E¢ciencies and Externalities
Consider some technological change that a¤ects the production of human
capital. We say that the provision of public education becomes more e¢cient
if, in the human capital process (1), ¯2=¯1 becomes larger without lowering
neither ¯1 nor ¯2:3 We say that the private provision of education becomes
more e¢cient if, in the process (1), ¯1=¯2 becomes larger while neither ¯1
nor ¯2 declines. Likewise, a technological improvement in the production of
human capital is said to be neutral if the ratio ¯2=¯1 remains unchanged
while both parameters increase. Let us consider now the e¤ects of each type
3There is a growing empirical literature that has given much attention to increased
e¢ciency of public education on pupils’ current and later achievements. One issue that has
been highlighted is the causal e¤ect of class size on human capital. For example, Lindahl
(2001) …nds that smaller classes in Sweden generate higher educational attainments.
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of technological improvement in the education process on intragenerational
income inequality.
Proposition 4 Consider the above economy. A technological improvement
in the production of human capital, given by equation (1), results in:
(a) If public provision of education becomes more e¢cient the intragen-
erational distribution of income becomes less unequal in all periods.
(b) If private provision of education becomes more e¢cient income in-
equality becomes larger in all periods.
(c) If the technological improvement is neutral the inequality in income
distribution remains unchanged at period 1 but declines for all periods after-
wards.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Let us consider now another type of a change in the ”home-component” of
the production of human capital and its economic implications in equilibrium.
Observe the process represented by (1). Let us vary the parameters v and
´, which relate to the role played by human capital of the parents or the
’environment’. Since we assume that v · 1 and ´ · 1 let us consider the
e¤ect that lower values will have on the inequality in income distributions in
equilibrium.
Proposition 5 Consider the process of production of human capital given
by (1). Then:
(a) Comparing two economies which di¤er only in this parameter v; the
economy with the lower v will have less inequality in the intragenerational
income distribution in all periods.
(b) Comparing two economies which di¤er only in the parameter ´; the
economy with the lower value of ´ will have more inequality in the income
distribution in all periods.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Let us consider now the e¤ect that technological improvement in the
production of human capital will have on output in equilibrium. Consider
(1) and remember that we call the …rst term on the RHS, ¯1et(!)hÀt (!), the
home-component, and the second term, ¯2egth
´
t , the public-component. Now
we prove:
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Proposition 6 Consider the human capital production process given by (1)
and the following types of technological improvements:
(a) Increasing ¯1, or increasing v or both, will increase output in all dates.
(b) Increasing ¯2, or increasing ´ or both, will result in higher output in
all periods.
If we consider the computor-information revolution as a technological im-
provement in enhancing knowledge, then we ask whether the home-component
bene…ts more than the public- component in the formation process of human
capital. We believe that computors and internet have enhanced the home-
education considerably, while schools bene…t only in a limited manner. The
following corollary may provide some explanation to the recent widespread
phenomena (mostly during the nineties) that in the OECD countries eco-
nomic growth is accompanied by increasing inequality in the distribution of
income.
Corollary 7 (a) In the following two cases of technological improvement in
the home-component we obtain higher economic growth coupled with more
inequality in the distribution of income: (i) an increase in ¯1 (ii) an increase
in v.
(b) In the following two cases of technological improvement in the public-
component we obtain higher economic growth coupled with less inequality in
the distribution of income: (i) an increase in ¯2; (ii) an increase in ´:
In terms of results, it is remarkable that both cases of technological im-
provement yield similar predictions on growth but opposite on income dis-
tribution. In this regard, Table 3 adds that inequality as measured by Gini
coe¢cients is more sensitive to externalities arising from the home compo-
nent than from those arising from the public part of human capital formation.
Decreasing returns in parents’ human capital (column 2) reduce inequality
substantially, all individuals becoming equal in the long-run. In contrast sub-
stantial income inequality is observed with increasing returns (column 4).4
Columns 2 and 4 establish a positive correlation between growth and income
4Externalities that yield increasing returns to scale to parents’ human capital, that is
À > 1; have been observed in China [Knight and Shi (1996)] and are therefore not a mere
theoretical curiosum.
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inequality. In column 2, decreased inequality is obtained at the expense of
growth, whether measured in terms of income or human capital (not shown).
Vice versa in column 4. In contrast, when looking at changes in ´; the cor-
relation between growth and income inequality is negative as indicated in
columns 3 and 5.
[Insert Tables 3 and 4]
Table 4 looks at a technological improvement in human capital formation
represented here by rises in the ¯ 0s: Columns 2 to 4 show that a greater
e¢ciency in education is always conducive to growth while hardly a¤ecting
income distributions. A comparison of columns 2 and 3 shows the stronger
impact that parental education has on output growth.
5 Majority Voting
Though there is a growing awareness of governments in education, enhanc-
ing human capital skills require …nancial resources to cover the investment.
Though the majority of constituents recognize the importance of learning,
they are not prepared to contribute …nancially via income taxes in the same
way. To establish the preferences of each individual with respect to ¿ t(!)
let us compute the reduced-form utility of each agent. Substituting the …rst
order conditions in (5), lifetime utility of agent ! can be rewritten as:
ut(!) = -t(1 ¡ ¿ t(!))®1+®2(1 ¡ ¿ t+1(!))®3
(¯1ht(!)
v + ¯2¿ t(!)h
´
t )
®3+®4 (24)
where -t groups all parameters and variables like factor rewards which
are given to atomistic individuals. Knowing that each agent cannot enforce
any tax rate at the future date, i.e. ¿ t+1(!) is given to him, the maximization
of (24) with respect to ¿ t(!) gives:
¿ t(!) =
(®3 + ®4)
(®1 + ®2 + ®3 + ®4)
¡ (®1 + ®2)
(®1 + ®2 + ®3 + ®4)
¯1ht(!)º
¯2h
´
t
(25)
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Each agent chooses the optimal ¿ t(!) such that the cost of current spend-
ing on education (in terms of foregone current and future consumption) is
equal to the reward of a marginal increase in the human capital of their chil-
dren. It is clear that the heterogeneity in ¿ t(!) derives from the heterogeneity
in human capital. When ´ · 1 and v · 1 above-average agents are willing
to pay a lower tax rate than below-average agents. In terms of numerical
results, the …rst step in our simulations computes a vector of ¿ t(!) based on
(25). Given this vector of individual preferences for education expenditure,
we assume that the level of public schooling is obtained at each date through
majority voting. Numerically, majority voting boils down to identifying the
median voter’s preference for public schooling.
[Insert Tables 5 and 6]
Tables 5 and 6 repeat the exercises performed in Tables 3 and 4, now with
endogenous public education. What di¤erence does it make? Baseline is dif-
ferent because the distribution of human capital being negatively skewed,
the median voter’s human capital lies to the left of the mean and therefore
he/she wishes a higher tax rate. Tables 5 and 6 reproduce the substitution in
equilibrium between public education and parental education observed be-
fore: any increase in ¿ t decreases the time spent on parental education et and
hence, raises leisure. This substitution among types of provision of education
has a number of implications, one of which being that Gini coe¢cients vary
more. It is important to note that simulation results con…rm the robustness
of Corollary 7 whose results apply also to the case of endogenous public edu-
cation. A positive correlation between income inequality and income growth
is obtained when externalities or e¢ciencies arising from parents’ human
capital vary. In contrast, this correlation is negative when externalities or
e¢ciencies in the public contribution to human capital are considered.
6 Discussion
The paper studies the determinants of income distribution and growth in an
overlapping generations economy with heterogenous households. Heterogen-
ity results simply from the distribution of human capital across individuals
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in a nondegenerate way. Both parental tutoring and public education con-
tribute to human capital accumulation.
In this framework, the following results are derived. (a) Initial conditions
matter. For example, a country that starts with higher levels of human cap-
ital, not necessarily less equal, has a better chance to maintain less income
inequality in the future. Hence, communities which create a culture of liter-
acy and life learning are more likely to experience lower income inequality.
(b) There is an important role for public education. Under the assumption
that the tax rate that …nances education is positive and similar for all lev-
els of income, inequality declines over time. Increasing this tax rate in an
attempt to enhance the provision of public education results in less income
inequality. (c) In our framework a technological change in the aggregate
production function has no impact on the distribution of income. Therefore,
we consider only technological improvements in the human capital accumu-
lation process. As we show the e¤ect is ambiguous. If improvements occur
mainly in home-education, growth increases while inequality in the income
distribution increases. In contrast, if technological improvement a¤ects pub-
lic education then higher growth and less income inequality are obtained.
This result creates challenges for policy-makers since independent policies
a¤ecting parental education only cannot serve two masters at the same time
while those a¤ecting public education can.
Since our model makes some speci…c and simplifying assumptions let us
discuss the robustness of our results. First, it is important to note that in-
troducing intergenerational monetary transfers in our model will modify the
results: in such a case, technological progress in the aggregate production
function may have di¤erent e¤ects on the intragenerational income distribu-
tions [see Karni and Zilcha (1994)]. Second, the framework can be general-
ized by introducing an additional redistributive measure by the government,
such as social security. This may vary some of our conclusions. Third, our
theoretical analysis does not depend on the levels of the public provision
of education, fegtg. The choice of some ’optimal’ level of public education
requires some social welfare function due to the heterogeneity of the house-
holds. However, the majority voting criterion is widely used in economic
theory, hence, one can determine this level using the median voter’s optimal
choice. This has been used in our numerical simulations.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider two equilibria in which human capital
accumulation is described by (1). Variables under the second equilibrium are
marked by ”*”. Let us rewrite eq. (23) for both equilibria:
yt+1(!) = Ct[hÀt (!) +
¯2
¯1
egth
´
t ]
y¤t+1(!) = C¤t [h¤Àt (!) +
¯2
¯1
egth
¤´
t ]
where Ct and C¤t are positive constants.
Since h0 and h¤0 are equally distributed, the same holds for hv0(!) and
[h¤0(!)]v, since v · 1. Moreover, since h0 < h¤0 we obtain that h¤1(!) is more
equal than h1(!) [again, see Lemma 2 in Karni and Zilcha (1994)]. It is easy
to verify from (18) that h1(!) are lower than h¤1(!) for all !. In particular
we obtain that [h¤1(!)]v is more equal than [h1(!)]v [see Theorem 3.A.5 in
Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994)]. Also we have [ h1]´ < [ h
¤
1]´. This
implies, using (16), that h¤2(!) is more equal than h2(!). As in our earlier
proofs it is easy to see that this process can be continued to generalize this
to all periods.¥
Proof of Proposition 2. Let us show …rst that in each generation
individuals with higher level of human capital choose at the optimum higher
level of time to be allocated for private education of their o¤spring. To see
this let us derive from the …rst order conditions, using some manipulation,
the following equation:
1 ¡ [1 + ¯1®4
®3
]et(!) =
®4¯2
®3
egth
´
t [h
¡À
t (!)] (26)
which demonstrates that higher ht(!) implies higher level of et(!). Let us
show that such a property generates less equality in the distribution of yt+1(!)
compared to that of yt(!): It is useful however, to apply (16) for this issue.
In fact it represents the period t+1 income yt+1(!) as a function of the date t
income yt(!) via the human capital evolution. De…ne the functionQ : R! R
such that Q[ht(!)] = ht+1(!) using (16). This monotone increasing function
satis…es: Q(x) > 0 for any x > 0 and Q(x)x is decreasing in x. Therefore [see,
Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994)], the human capital distribution ht+1(!) is
more equal than the ditribution in date t, ht(!): This implies that yt+1(!) is
more equal than yt(!).¥
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Proof of Proposition 3. Let us consider Eq. (16) for t = 0: Since
h0(!) is given, hv0(!) and h0 are …xed. By raising eg0 the distribution of
the human capital for generation 1, h1(!) becomes more equal. This follows
from Lemma 2 in Karni and Zilcha (1994). Moreover, we claim from (16)
that the average human capital in generation 1 increases as well. Increasing
eg0 will result in higher h1(!) for all ! and higher level of h1. Moreover, it
also implies that hv1(!) will have a more equal distribution [see, Shaked and
Shanthikumar (1994), Theorem 3.A.5].
Now, let us consider t = 1. Increasing eg1 will imply the following facts:
hv1(!) becomes more equal and ¯2eg1h
´
1 is larger than its value before we
increased the levels of public education. Using (16) and the same Lemma
as before we obtain that h2(!) becomes more equal. This process can be
continued for t = 3; 4; :::::, which establishes our claim.¥
Proof of Proposition 4. Let the initial distribution of human capital
h0(!) be given. Compare the following two equilibria from the same initial
conditions: One with the human capital formation process given by (1) and
another with the same process but ¯2 is replaced by a larger coe¢cient ¯
¤
2 >
¯2: Clearly, we keep ¯1 unchanged. Let us rewrite eq. (23) as follows:
yt+1(!) = Ct[hÀt (!) +
¯2
¯1
egth
´
t ]
y¤t+1(!) = C¤t [h¤Àt (!) +
¯¤2
¯¤1
egth¤
´
t ]
where Ct and C¤t are some positive constants. Since h0(!) is …xed at date
t = 0 we …nd [using once again the Lemma from Karni and Zilcha (1994)]
that ¯
¤
2
¯1
> ¯2¯1 imply that y
¤
1(!) is more equal to y1(!). We also derive that
h1(!) are lower than h¤1(!) for all ! and , hence, h1 < h
¤
1. By (16), using
the same argument as in the last proof, h¤v1 (!) is more equal than hv1(!)
and ¯
¤
2
¯1
eg1h
¤´
1 >
¯2
¯1
eg1h
´
1, hence h¤2(!) is more equal than h2(!): This same
argument can be continued for all dates t = 3; 4; 5; ::::: which completes the
proof of part (a) of this Proposition. The proof of part (b) follows from the
same types of arguments using the fact that if ¯1 < ¯
¤
1 then
¯2
¯1
> ¯
¤
2
¯¤1
and,
hence, h1(!) is more equal than h¤1(!) and h1 > h
¤
1. This process leads, using
similar arguments as before, to yt(!) more equal than y¤t (!) for all periods
t. Consider now the claim in part (c). From (16) we see that inequality in
the distribution of h1(!) remains unchanged even though all levels of h1(!)
increase due to this technological improvement. In particular, h1 increases.
Now, since inequality of hv1(!) did not vary but the second term in the RHS
of (16) has increased due to the higher value of h1, we obtain more equal
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distribution of h2(!). Now, this argument can be used again at dates 3, 4,
...., which completes the proof.¥
Proof of Proposition 5. Assume, without loss of generality, that
h0(!) ¸ 1 for all !. Since the two economies have the same initial dis-
tribution of human capital h0(!) the process that determines h1(!) di¤ers
only in the parameter v. Denote by v¤ < v · 1 the parameters, then it
is clear that [h0(!)]v
¤ is more equal than [h0(!)]v since it is attained by a
strictly concave transformation [see, Theorem 3.A.5 in Shaked and Shan-
thikumar (1994)]. Likewise, the human capital distribution h¤1(!) is more
equal than the ditribution h1(!): This implies that y¤1(!) is more equal than
y1(!). Now we can apply the same argument to date 1: the distribution of
[h¤1(!)]v
¤ is more equal than that of [h1(!)]v, hence, using (16) and the above
reference, we derive that the distribution of [h¤2(!)]v
¤ is more equal than
that of [h2(!)]v. This process can be continued for all t.
When we lower the value of ´, keeping all other parameters constant,
we basically lower the second term in (16), [h0]´, while [h0(!)]v remains
unchanged. By Lemma 2 in Karni and Zilcha (1994) we obtain that the
distribution of h1(!) becomes less equal. This can be continued for t = 2
as well since it is easy to verify that [h1]´ decreases while [h1(!)]v becomes
less equal. This process can be extended to t = 2; 3; ::::, which complete the
proof.¥
Proof of Proposition 6. Let us just sketch the proof of this claim.
Any technological improvement, either in the public-component or the home-
component, will imply higher human capital stock as of period 1 and on.
Since, the initial capital stock is given this will increase the output in date
1 and, hence, the aggregate savings in this period. Thus the output in date
2 will be higher and hence the capital stock to be used as well. This process
continues in all coming periods.¥
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Table 1 Baseline and Parameters of the Utility Function*
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
®1 = ®2 = 1 ®1 = 1:1 ®2 = 1:1 ®3 = 2:2 ®4 = 1:1
®3 = 2
®4 = 1
Relative factor returns .471 .504 .442 .492 .451
(1 + rt)=wt .471 .505 .441 .493 .450
Gini coe¢cient (gt) .155 .155 .155 .155 .155
.025 .025 .025 .025 .025
Growth rate (%) 28 27.7 28.3 31.8 24
(aggr. output) 28 28 28 32 23.9
Parental education (et)
Poorest agent .550 .550 .550 .578 .521
.596 .596 .596 .621 .570
Richest agent .622 .622 .622 .646 .598
.605 .605 .605 .630 .580_____________
*Notes: Column (1) is the baseline scenario assuming ¿ = 0:2; ®1 = ®2 =
®4 = 1; ®3 = 2; A = 4; µ = :3; ¯1 = ¯2 = 1:6; À = ´ = 1: Each row reports
the average over the …rst 10 periods and the average of the second 10 periods.
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Table 2 Baseline and Public Education
(1) (2)
¿ = :2 ¿ = :22
Relative factor returns .471 .493
(1 + rt) =wt .471 .495
Gini coe¢cient (gt) .155 .145
.025 .020
Growth rate (%) 28 29.7
(aggr. output) 28 30.1
Parental education (et)
Poorest agent .550 .543
.596 .590
Richest agent .622 .616
.605 .598
29
Table 3 Baseline and Other Speci…cation Externalities
Externalities (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
À 1 .9 1 1.1 1
´ 1 1 .9 1 1.1
Relative factor returns .471 .366 .445 .816 .513
(1 + rt)=wt .471 .345 .430 3.290 .581
Gini coe¢cient (gt) .155 .095 .182 .288 .129
(income) .025 .003 .050 .327 .008
Growth rate (%) 28 7.1 23.0 86.9 35.9
(aggr. output) 28 2.9 20.0 large 48.1
Parental education (et)
Poorest agent .550 .550 .570 .548 .518
.596 .578 .621 .633 .527
Richest agent .622 .598 .636 .649 .597
.605 .580 .632 .661 .533
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Table 4 Baseline and Other Speci…cation E¢ciency
E¢ciency (1) (2) (3) (4)
¯1 1.6 1.76 1.6 1.76
¯2 1.6 1.6 1.76 1.76
Relative factor returns .471 .526 .482 .537
(1 + rt)=wt .471 .528 .483 .540
Gini coe¢cient (gt) .155 .166 .145 .155
(income) .025 .031 .020 .025
Growth rate (%) 28 38.2 30.0 40.2
(aggr. output) 28 38.7 30.1 40.8
Parental education (et)
Poorest agent .550 .556 .543 .550
.596 .601 .590 .596
Richest agent .622 .627 .616 .622
.605 .612 .598 .605
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Table 5 Externalities and Median Voter
Externalities (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
À 1 .9 1 1.1 1
´ 1 1 .9 1 1.1
Tax rate (¿ t) .222 .299 .109 .101 .347
.203 .323 .031 .019 .460
Relative factor returns .496 .447 .384 .684 .751
(1 + rt)=wt .476 .440 .315 2.31 1.670
Gini coe¢cient (gt) .143 .079 .213 .338 .096
(income) .021 .001 .127 .586 .001
Growth rate (%) 30.1 12.4 9.3 80.6 52.8
(aggr. output) 28.6 8.5 10.3 large large
Parental education (et)
Poorest agent .539 .496 .602 .585 .422
.595 .511 .657 .641 .189
Richest agent .616 .556 .651 .657 .519
.603 .511 .662 .666 .191
32
Table 6 E¢ciency and Median Voter
E¢ciency (1) (2) (3) (4)
¯1 1.6 1.76 1.6 1.76
¯2 1.6 1.6 1.76 1.76
Tax rate (¿ t) .222 .188 .254 .222
.203 .166 .238 .203
Relative factor returns .496 .516 .545 .565
(1 + rt)=wt .476 .490 .532 .546
Gini coe¢cient (gt) .143 .166 .124 .143
(income) .021 .037 .011 .021
Growth rate (%) 30.1 37.8 35.0 42.6
(aggr. output) 28.6 35.4 34.7 41.4
Parental education (et)
Poorest agent .539 .560 .517 .539
.595 .611 .577 .595
Richest agent .616 .630 .600 .616
.603 .622 .583 .603
33
